Introduction

When the Knights of St. John came to Malta in 1530, they were not very convinced of remaining here because, when compared to Rhodes, Malta did not seem to offer much. However, it did have some advantages. First it was strategically placed in the middle of the Mediterranean and secondly, it had two good harbours, the Grand Harbour and Marsamxett. In 1530, the general picture of the fortifications on the islands was not very encouraging since they were in ruins and obsolete, consisting of one in Mdina and one in Gozo, and the Castrum Maris inside the Grand Harbour. As far back as 1524, the commission, which came to Malta on behalf of the knights, already looked at the Sciberras Peninsula as its possible fortified centre because of its strategic position. In fact, this peninsula was situated between the two harbours and therefore would safeguard the entrance to both ports. But such project needed time and money to be realised. Although the knights accepted the islands, they were not resigned to the loss of Rhodes and until well into the second half of the century there was talk of leaving Malta. According to Hoppen, "only with the building of Valletta in the years after 1566 did the knights finally commit themselves to Malta as permanent base." (Hoppen, pg. 23)

Therefore, the question of fortification between 1530 and 1565 was whether to invest money in defences of what might be a temporary base. Since the existent fortifications were in a bad shape, the knights had no alternative but to undertake repair work and improvement of the artillery. Moreover, the loss of Tripoli in 1551 induced the Order to construct Fort St. Elmo on the tip of Sciberras Peninsula. However, it was quickly and badly designed. Although it put up a good resistance in the Great Siege of 1565, it eventually fell in the hands of the Turks. Notwithstanding this, the Turks failed to capture the islands.

The building of Valletta

With the election of Grand Master La Valette, enthusiasm for the new fortress on the Sceberras Peninsula gathered momentum. The Grand Master strongly advocated for the construction of a new capital city. In 1558 the Italian engineer Bartolomeo Genga was instructed to draw up designs for a new fortress but due to lack of funds and fear of a Turkish attack, the project was not executed. Although his drawings no longer survive, it is known that his city embraced most of the peninsula, with its main front facing on the site of the outer defences later built at Floriana. The city was separated from Fort St. Elmo. Another engineer, Baldassare Lanci came to Malta in 1562. Lanci's city was to be smaller than that proposed by Genga. The opportunity of carrying out such proposals was lost when the Turks attacked Malta in 1565. As a result of the siege fortifications were in ruins, many knights were killed or wounded, the treasury was empty and debts were heavy. Moreover, there was the fear that the Turks might return. However, the siege attracted the financial support from Europe, which was needed for the building of a new city.

In the last days of 1565 military engineer Francesco Laparelli arrived to Malta. On 3rd January Laparelli presented his first report. He found that the fortifications of Birgu, Senglea and St. Elmo had been so badly damaged that it would be 4 months before 4000 workmen could raise ramparts sufficient enough to present an obstacle to the enemy. Thus he was in favour of the scheme of fortifying the Sciberras Peninsula. However, no detailed plan had been possible in the short time available to him. Thus, on 13th January he submitted another report. He believed that it would be a great mistake to start the work, which might not be finished in time. In fact, he feared that this might happen because the knights did not have the men, materials and tools for such project. He also was very concerned with the fact that the Turks might attack with the project was half finished.

Laparelli suggested that the front line should run across the middle of the peninsula and that a fort had to be built on the high ground whose guns would be able to cover half the peninsula, leaving the guns on St. Elmo to cover the intervening stretch of land. Moreover, the land front of this proposed fort could be converted into the main land front of the new city and lateral walls could be built to embrace the remainder of the peninsula and the existing structure of St. Elmo. Laparelli's final proposal for the fortified enceinte of the new city, which was called Valletta (after the Grand Master La Valette), was published in June 1566 and with it he submitted four drawings. The main line of the defences was the same on each drawing, i.e. four bastions stretching from Marsamxett harbour to the Grand Harbour, with two irregular transverse fronts made up of a combination of flat and polygonal bastions to cope with the irregularity of the site. There were to be nine cavaliers, of which only two were built. The cavaliers on each side of the main gate were to be higher than the ramparts of the bastions. A main street ran straight from the gate on the land front to St. Elmo. Initially, he proposed a city with curving, flowing streets, but this idea had to be abandoned in favour of a grid layout designed so that guns could be moved easily from place to place. All Laparelli's surviving plans show that despite modifications over the years, the Valletta fortifications remain fundamentally as he designed them.

The decision to build the new city was formally taken on 14th March 1566. On the 28th of March 1566, the foundation stone of the new city was laid by the Grand Master, who however, died before the city was finished. By early April 1566, the new city proceeded under Laparelli's guidance without serious interruption. There was no time to waste since the Turks could attack any time. In this respect, Mallia Milanes argues that the foundation of Valletta was done with an "indecent haste" due to "phobia of invasion". However, according to Hoppen, the construction of the new city of Valletta was the first link in what was to become an ever-expanding chain of defence, first encircling the harbour area and then, gradually, expanding in the whole island.

The major items that were abandoned after work commenced were the 'manderaggio', or galley port, and the arsenal, a ship repair yard. Since the Sciberras Peninsula had no natural harbours or creeks, it was decided to excavate two valleys on the Marsamxett flank down to sea level to create artificial basins. Work started on the 'manderaggio', but was stopped when the stone (which was being used in the building of houses of Valletta) proved unsuitable for this purpose. This, together with the realisation that Marsamxett did not offer sufficient shelter in rough weather, led to the abandonment of the project. Eventually, an unplanned mass of slum dwellings was built in the old quarry. There is no evidence that the work on the arsenal began since Laparelli made no provision for an entrance gap in the enceinte.

With the design of Valletta complete and work well underway, in 1569, Laparelli departed from Malta. He unfortunately did not return because he died of plague at Candia (Crete) a year later. Work on the city was continued by his Maltese assistant Girolamo Cassar. According to Hoppen, the fact that the Order entrusted this work to their resident engineer was in itself an indication of the progress which had been made. By 1571, Valletta's fortifications had reached an advanced stage in their construction, that the Order decided to transfer its convent from Birgu to Valletta. However, the city was far from being complete.

In 1577 Scipione Campi from Pesaro recommended the construction of curved orillions, the deepening and widening of the ditches and the enlargement of the two cavaliers on the land front. This work was in fact executed. In 1614, the Vendome bastion adjoining Fort St. Elmo was also built. In 1632, the Grand Master commissioned Tommaso Dingli, a Maltese architect to design Porta Reale, the main gate to the city, which was to replace the older Porta San Giorgio built by Laparelli.

In the 17th century it was clear that the land front of Valletta, though well designed, was not strong enough to withstand a heavy attack. With the increasing improvements of guns and with the introduction of mortars firing shells over considerable distance, it was necessary to create stronger defences to safeguard Valletta from attempted attacks. For this purpose, in 1635, Pietro Paolo Floriani arrived in Malta and proposed the Floriana Lines to be constructed across the neck of the peninsula well beyond the Valletta front. Thus, began the first of the ring of fortifications built to strenghten the citadel. Floriani's first report was submitted to the council in October 1638. It was accepted and despite strong opposition the Floriana lines were constructed. Laparelli's front to Valletta was also strengthened by the addition of counterguards in front of the bastions and a lunette to cover the main gate. This work was completed in 1645. Later, in 1681, C. Grunenberg proposed the construction of three bastions in front of Fort St. Elmo, very similar to those proposed by Laparelli in 1566. These were now constructed.

In July 1715 De Tigné produced a report which criticised Valletta's defences. He recommended that communication should be by means of sally ports and caponiers in the ditch. The covertway was too narrow, its parapets too low and it lacked traverses and places of arms. The lunette should be built covering the main gate. This shows that the lunette proposed in 1638 was in fact not built.

The problem of the bombardment on the flanks was solved by the construction of new defences. The Grand Harbour flank was protected by the Sta. Margherita Lines, the Cottonera Lines and Fort Ricasoli built during the 17th century, and the Marsamxett flank was protected by Fort Manoel and Fort Tigné built in the 18th century. In the later part of the 18th century no attempt was made at redesigning the fortifications to bring them into line with modern standards. The work that was performed was of a minor nature such as repairs and maintenance. Modifications were aimed for more convenience or due to rumours of attack. In a survey of fortifications carried out about 1789 revealed that many of the existing works had deteriorated seriously. Undoubtedly this neglect of the fortifications had arisen partly because of the precarious financial state of the Order. The surrender of Valletta, 'the very heart of the Order', on the first occasion in which they had come under serious attack, by the French (and not by the Turks!), cannot be blamed on the design or condition of the fortifications. In fact, Hoppen argues that the conquest of the island by Napoleon in 1798 was far more than a military defeat, but "it signalled the final collapse of the Order itself which no fortress, however strong, perfect or up-to-date, could have prevented."

The British Period

Except for some alterations, little work was done to Valletta for many years to come and in fact the British took over the existing system and continued to defend it, almost unaltered, until the middle of the 19th century. Valletta acted as a citadel in the 18th century, and this continued to be so during the British occupation.

After 1800, the British employed their own military engineers. These did extensive modifications to the miles of fortifications, which encircled Valletta and later built a serious of detached coastal defence forts outside the enceinte of the fortress. Hence, the defence of the citadel and the dockyard would not depend on their immediate circuit of walls but upon groups of detached forts. Such work was undertaken later in the second half of the century.

In 1844, in the Harding Report, Valletta appears as the citadel of the Maltese defences. At the time Valletta held most of the British garrison in Malta. However, when compared with the 17,000 men available to the knights when they capitulated in 1798, the British garrison was insignificant, especially when one considers that there were 25 miles of fortifications pierced by 8 main gates and numerous sally ports. Harding thus suggested that the number of troops should increase form 3,000 to 6,000. The main problem was to secure the gates, due to the fact that Valletta was a big commercial city needing to have open gates all the time. In the process, some of the old baroque gates were rebuilt, amongst which Porta Reale.

In 1852, alterations and improvements were proposed for the main gate including the provision of additional guardroom accommodation. In the following year, St. John's Cavalier was converted into bombproof barracks, being near to the main gate. Steps were also taken to safeguard St. Elmo against an attack from within the city and numerous musketry loopholes were constructed in the fort. General Reid was very much concerned with improving the Valletta fortifications. He also wished to rearm the batteries, especially on the battlements of the city that looked down onto the harbours. In fact, old guns were replaced by more modern ones on the batteries of Valletta. However, these continued to be occupied by a variety of old guns with few modern ones. In 1888, generals Nicholson and Goodenough wrote that, "there are a large number of obsolete guns in Valletta which contribute nothing to the strength of the fortress, and we consider that it will be advantageous from every point of view to remove them together with their stores and ammunition which, kept for the most part in unsafe magazines, constitute a distinct source of danger..."(as quoted in Hughes, 1993, pg. 261)

The first major work of British fortification in Valletta was the construction of Lascaris Bastion at the foot of the saluting battery on the upper Barrracca in 1854. In 1882, the defence committee suggested the demolition of the land front of Valletta. It pointed out that, as early as 1872, it had been proposed to level the outworks of Valletta in order to extend the Floriana parade ground and only retain the main parapet and ditch of Valletta. The project proved too expensive, and moreover, they provided a useful barrier against the over-population of the city.

Another problem concerned the entrance of the Grand Harbour, which sheltered the British fleet. Traditionally, a heavy chain stretched across the harbour was used to keep out enemy ships. In 1901, it was decided to construct a breakwater (at the cost of £1 million), to extend from the point of Valletta peninsula at St. Elmo, out across the waters of the Grand Harbour, thus, reducing the size of the entrance and protecting the fleet from both the strong winds and torpedo attacks.


Conclusion

Generally the British adopted a policy of repairing the existing works. In their early years on Malta, the British concentrated on the problem of defending the citadel of Valletta and the naval dockyard. It was only in the beginning of the 20th century that they reverted to a policy of fighting on the beaches, a policy that was to remain in operation throughout the Second World War. Although the Order of St. John had succeeded in physically transforming the barren Sciberras Peninsula into "an epitome of civilised Europe", (as quoted in V. Mallia Milanes (1993)) because of the advancements made in warfare, Valletta could no longer fulfil the aim for which it was originally built.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

HOPPEN, A., 1979. The Fortification of Malta by the Order of St. John 1530-1798, Britain: Scottish Academic Press.

HUGHES, Q., 'The military life of a fortress: Malta since the 16th century', in Fortress: the Castles and Fortifications Quarterly, No 3, November 1989

HUGHES, Q., 1993. Malta: a guide to fortifications, Malta: Said International Ltd.

MALLIA MILANES, V., (ed.) 1993. Hospitaller Malta 1530-1798, Malta: Mireva Publications Ltd.

SPITERI, S., 1994. Fortress of the Cross, Malta: Heritage Interpretation Services.

SPITERI, S., 1996. British Military Architecture in Malta, Malta: the author.

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